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RECENT DEVELOPMENT

LAWSON v. STATE: IT IS ADMISSIBLE FOR A SOCIAL
WORKER ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE OF HER
PROFESSION TO TESTIFY TO A CHILD DECLARANT'S
OUT-OF-COURT STATEMENTS REGARDING CHILD
ABUSE OR SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN OF TENDER
YEARS WHEN THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE IS
SATISFIED
By: Alice Arcieri
A social worker may testify to an out-of-court statement made to
her by a victim of child abuse, when she is acting within the course of
her profession, the child testifies at trial and is available for crossexamination. Lawson v. State, 389 Md. 570, 886 A.2d 876. In
addition, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that prejudicial
statements admitted that are not properly cured during closing
arguments constitutes plain error. Id
In July 2002, Nigha, a seven-year-old female, told her mother, Ms.
Thomas ("Thomas"), that a man had sexually molested her. Thomas
reported the sexual abuse to the police and Nigha was examined by a
doctor and interviewed by a social worker, Jennifer Cann ("Cann").
All three females testified at triaL Nigha described two distinct
incidents. In 2001, Joseph Lawson ("Lawson") had been living with
Nigha's family when the first abuse occurred. One night, Lawson
exposed his genitalia to Nigha, pulled down her pants and penetrated
her slightly. In June 2002, Nigha came home from school and Lawson
was there, even though he no longer lived with her family. Lawson
took Nigha into a bedroom and offered her soda in return for letting
him touch her genitalia. Although Nigha refused, Lawson tried to pull
down her pants. She told him to stop and left the room. She said she
did not see his genitalia during that incident.
At trial, Thomas and Cann testified to a similar account regarding
the first incident, but the second incident was inconsistent. Thomas
stated that Nigha told her that she saw Lawson's genitalia the second
time and that he was wearing a condom. Cann testified that Nigha
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spoke of three incidents of abuse including a statement that Lawson
had penetrated her as well during the second incident.
On July 8, 2003, the Circuit Court of Prince George's County
convicted Lawson of two counts of second-degree rape, two counts of
attempted second-degree rape and two counts of second-degree
assault. Lawson appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, which affirmed in part and reversed one count of seconddegree rape and attempted second-degree rape. The Court held that
the social worker's testimony was admissible, the prosecutor's closing
remarks were harmless and did not cause reversible error, and without
corroborative evidence for the second allegation, that conviction was
reversed. However, an out-of-court statement by Nigha who testified
at trial was sufficient to convict Lawson on the first count. Lawson
filed a writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals and the Court granted
certiorari.
The Court determined the out-of-court statements of a child to a
social worker were admissible under the statutory interpretation of
Section 11-304 of Maryland Criminal Procedure. Id. at 581, 886 A.2d
at 882 (citing MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. Section 11-304(c)(4)).
The Court held that Nigha's statements to Cann were admissible under
the statute because she meets the tender years doctrine of being under
twelve-years-old, her statements regarding sexual abuse were offered
for the truth of the matter asserted, and the statements were given to a
social worker acting in her professional capacity. Id. at 582, 886 A.2d
at 883. Under this statute, the Court held that the social worker's
testimony was admissible because the Confrontation Clause was
satisfied based on Nigha's testimony at trial, even if her statements
were testimonial. Id. at 589, 886 A.2d at 887 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. PROC. Section 11-304(d)-(f)); see State v. Snowden, 385 Md.
64, 867 A.2d 314 (2005) (explaining the statute requirements of
Section 11-304 under the Confrontation Clause).
The Court of Appeals described the standard of review for
reversible error, and stated that an appellate court will not reverse
"unless that error is 'both manifestly wrong and substantially
injurious'." Id. at 580, 886 A.2d at 882 (citing 1. W Berman Props. v.
Porter Bros., 276 Md. 1, 11-12, 344 A.2d 65, 72 (1975)). The Court
stated that in a criminal case, an error is harmless only if an appellate
court decides "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not in any
way influence the verdict." Id. at 581, 886 A.2d at 882 (citing Dorsey
v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665,678 (1976)).
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The Court analyzed the prosecutor's closing remarks and
determined whether the trial court interfered to cure any improper
statements. ld. at 589,886 A.2d at 887. The Court stated that it would
only reverse if the improper remarks "actually misled the jury or were
likely to have misled or influenced the jury to the prejudice of the
accused" and there was an abuse of discretion. ld. at 592, 886 A.2d at
889 (citing Degren v. State, 352 Md. 400, 722 A.2d 887 (1999)).
The Court explained each allegation and the holding of the Court of
Special Appeals. Although the prosecutor used a "golden rule"
argument, the Court of Special Appeals held that the general jury
instructions cured any prejudice. ld. at 594, 886 A.2d at 890.
Although the prosecutor used terms like "monster" and "sexual
molester" in her closing remarks, the Court of Special Appeals held
that the statements were isolated and did not directly refer to Lawson,
so there was no prejudicial effect on the verdict. ld. at 597, 886 A.2d
at 891-92. Although the Court of Appeals had not addressed the issue
of future criminality in closing remarks, the Court of Special Appeals
held that the statements were improper because they were not based on
evidence at trial. ld. at 599, 886 A.2d at 893.
Through this analysis, the Court of Appeals held that the
prosecutor's improper statements should be evaluated as a whole. ld.
at 600,886 A.2d at 893. The prosecutor shifted the burden on Lawson
to prove that Nigha had a motive to lie, although Nigha's credibility
was essential because she gave the primary evidence to convict
Lawson. ld. at 596, 886 A.2d at 891. The prosecutor's indirect
statements, "monster" and "sexual molester," were intended to
describe Lawson, even without a direct reference to his name. ld. at
599, 886 A.2d at 892-93. The prosecutor's allegation regarding
Lawson's possible future molestation of an eleven-year-old boy living
with him was highly prejudicial. ld. at 599, 886 A.2d at 893. Through
this assessment, as a whole the improper closing remarks had a
prejudicial effect which contaminated the jury's verdict. ld. at 604,
886 A.2d at 895-96.
U sing the factors in Spain, the Court held that there was less
evidence with even more severe remarks and the trial court's actions
to cure were insufficient. ld. at 600, 886 A.2d at 893 (citing Spain v.
State, 386 Md. 145, 161, 872 A.2d 25, 34 (2005)). There was not
overwhelming evidence against Lawson because both Thomas' and
Cann's testimony were inconsistent with Nigha's testimony regarding
the second allegation. ld. at 601, 886 A.2d at 894. Although there
was sufficient evidence to convict, the verdict should have been based

188

University of Baltimore Law Forum

[Vol. 36

on Nigha's credibility convincing the jury. Id. at 605, 886 A.2d at
896. The continuous admission of prejudicial statements heavily
weighed in favor of the conclusion that the jury's verdict was
influenced. Id. at 600-01, 886 A.2d at 894.
The trial judge's actions were inadequate to cure the prejudicial
influence on the jury. Id. at 604, 886 A.2d at 896. The trial court
overruled the objection regarding Lawson having the burden to prove
Nigha had a motive to lie. Id. at 601, 886 A.2d at 894. In addition,
the trial judge put only one paragraph in the jury instructions to
convey that the lawyers' statements were not evidence, but only
helpful to understand the application of law. Id. The same general
instruction was sent back to the jury after closing remarks had
concluded, but without any further explanation that it referred to the
prosecutor's prejudicial statements. Id. The Court found that the
judge's actions were insufficient, vague, allowed the statements to
continue, and did not "overcome the likelihood of prejudice." Id. at
603,886 A.2d at 895 (citing Hill v. State, 355 Md. 206, 226, 734 A.2d
199, 210 (1999); Wilhelm v. State, 272 Md. 404, 423-24, 326 A.2d
707, 720 (1974)).
At the end of its analysis, the Court touched on the issue of
corroborative evidence. Although this issue was moot based on the
fact that it related to the second allegation, which was reversed by the
Court of Special Appeals, the Court of Appeals held that corroborative
evidence is not required in rape cases if the victim testifies. Id. at 606,
886 A.2d at 897. Even if it were required, there was enough
independent evidence to support Lawson's conviction in the first
incident, based on the fact that Lawson had an opportunity to commit
the crime. Id. at 607, 886 A.2d at 897. Nigha's testimony was
corroborated by the social worker regarding the first incident and
partially corroborated regarding the second. Id. at 607, 886 A.2d at
897-98. In addition, Lawson admitted to knowing Nigha during the
time of the crime and that he would come to the house when only the
children were home. Id. Therefore, the jury had enough evidence to
conclude that Lawson had an opportunity to commit the crime. Id.
In this holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland effectively
explains the constitutional admissibility of the testimony of a social
worker and other professionals, who are required under law to report
statements of abuse received from a minor declarant. The public
policy of this admission is to protect children from abuse, report and
investigate allegations of abuse of children, and allow competent
professionals acting in the course of their duties to testify along with

2006)

Social Workers Testifying To Out-Of-Court Statements

189

the victim in giving corroborative evidence. In addition, the Court is
emphasizing the importance of giving every person an impartial trial
and recognizing that when a trial judge's actions are inadequate to
cure prejudicial effect, the appellate courts must intervene to correct
this plain error.

